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1.  Introduction 
     Languages have some linguistic means to express the source of information 
from which a given proposition is obtained.  In the field of linguistic typology, the 
linguistic category which marks the source of information is known as evidentiality.  
Evidential expressions “[cover] the way in which the information was acquired” 
(Aikhenvald (2004:3)):  they signal that the information in question was obtained 
via first-hand observation, inference, hearsay, and so on.  For concreteness, let us 
consider some evidential expressions in Japanese below:1 
 
 (1)  Ame-ga fut-tei-ru  {-sooda / -rashii / φ}. 
   rain-Nom fall-Asp-Pres {EvidHearsay / EvidInfer / EvidDir} 
    ‘I heard that it’s raining. / It’s likely that it’s raining. / It’s raining.’ 
 
The example above shows that Japanese has a variety of grammatical elements 
encoding the source of information (cf. Aoki (1986)).  For example, -sooda means 
that the propositional content in question is acquired from a third party, and -rashii 
signals that the propositional content is obtained as a consequence of the speaker’s 
inference.  In addition, the zero-evidential (indicated by φ) also contributes to the 
evidential interpretation.  It means that the propositional content is acquired by the 
speaker’s direct perception of the situation; namely, this form indicates that the 
speaker directly perceives that it is raining outside.   
     English, unlike Japanese, is a language that does not normally encode 
evidentiality; the evidential interpretation of a sentence relies on the context.  Let 
us consider the following example, cited from Shizawa (2015:162): 
 
 (2) a.  (The speaker is looking out the window.) Oh, it’s raining. 
  b.  It’s raining (, because they are walking under their umbrellas). 
  c.  A: What did John say? 
    B: It’s raining. 
 
As seen in (1), Japanese has the zero evidential marker (φ), which expresses the 
speaker’s direct perception, irrespective of the contextual information.  The 
situation, however, is different in English.  The examples in (2a-c) illustrate that 
                                                  
1 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses throughout this paper: Asp = aspect, 
Dir = Direct, Evid = evidential, Infer = inference, Nom = Nominative, Pres = present. 
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the evidential interpretation of the simple declarative sentence It’s raining is not 
fixed to the speaker’s direct perception.  The declarative sentence in (2a) receives 
an evidential interpretation that the speaker directly perceives that it is raining 
outside.  The same sentence is used to indicate that the propositional content is 
obtained as a result of the speaker’s inference, as in (2b).  Lastly, in (2c), speaker B 
is conveying to speaker A what John said, which suggests that declarative sentences 
also have a hearsay evidential interpretation.  These examples show that the 
evidential interpretation of a sentence in English depends on the context. 
     The lack of grammatical evidential expressions in English, however, does not 
mean that English is unable to mark evidentiality.  For example, English has an 
option to express evidentiality with recourse to the combinatory use of an 
embedding verb and its subject, as shown below: 
 
 (3) a.  I hear you have a brother that goes to Lehigh. 
  b.  She says they met the professor later. 
     (Fox (2001:172)) 
 
The syntactic element I hear in (3a) serves as a hearsay evidential, and she says in 
(3b) indicates that she is the source of information.  One important point here is 
that syntactic evidentials like the ones in (3a, b) cannot be seen as grammatical 
expressions listed in the lexicon because of their productivity.  It is easy to generate 
a variant of, for example, (3a) by replacing the subject with another NP and/or 
changing the present tense form into the past tense.  Thus, it will be concluded that 
syntactic evidentials are derived objects in English. 
     The question arising here is how sentences with evidential expressions are 
mapped onto the syntactic structure.  This paper thus aims to propose an analysis of 
the derivation of syntactic structures with evidentials in English on the basis of the 
cartographic framework proposed by Rizzi (1997, 2004) and Cinque (1999), coupled 
with the parallel architecture model by Ackema and Neeleman (2004). 
     This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces the cartographic 
framework, and Section 3 provides a cartographic analysis of evidential expressions, 
combined with the parallel architecture model.  Section 4 provides four pieces of 
evidence for the proposal given in Section 3.  Section 5 concludes this paper. 
 
2.  The Cartographic Framework 
     We would like first to briefly introduce the framework on which we depend, 
namely the cartographic framework.  Rizzi (1997, 2004) proposes the split CP 
hypothesis, according to which the CP domain is decomposed into several functional 
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projections dedicated to different discourse functions, as shown below: 
 
 (4) CP ⇒ Force … Topic (Top) … Focus (Foc) … Finite (Fin) IP 
 
The Force layer in (4) encodes the clause type of a given sentence as, for instance, 
declarative, and the Finite (Fin) layer encodes the finiteness of the sentence either as 
finite or non-finite.  The Topic (Top) and Focus (Foc) layers are sandwiched 
between Force and Finite, and occur in order.  For concreteness, let us consider the 
following contrast (Capitalized word denotes Focus): 
 
 (5) a.  This booki, to ROBINj I gave ti tj. (Culicover (2013:251)) 
  b. * To ROBINj this booki, I gave ti tj. (Haegeman (2012:31)) 
 
Sentence (5a) shows that the topic element the book precedes the focus element to 
Robin, and the sentence is grammatical.  The order of the two discourse elements is 
reversed in (5b), yielding an ungrammatical sentence.  The contrast in (5a, b) 
suggests that there is a fixed order between Topic and Focus.  The pattern is 
straightforwardly accounted for by assuming that Topic and Focus occur in the fixed 
order in accordance with the split CP hypothesis in (4).   
     In the cartographic (and minimalist) framework, it is argued that the 
C(onceptual)-I(ntentional) interface imposes a pragmatic requirement on the CP 
domain; broadly speaking, the use of the CP domain is due to the speaker’s 
communicative intention (cf. Rizzi (1997)).  If one has an intention to convey some 
topic information, the Top head is activated; otherwise, it is inert.  For instance, 
when activated, the Top head is endowed with the uninterpretable feature, [u-Top-F] 
(cf. Shlonsky (2010)).  If [u-Top-F] of the Top head is checked-off and deleted by 
merging a syntactic object bringing the interpretable feature [Top-F], the derivation 
converges; otherwise, the derivation crashes at LF.  This kind of interface condition 
is referred to as criterion in the cartographic framework (cf. Rizzi (1997)).   
 
3.  Proposal: A Cartographic Approach to Evidential Expressions in English 
     This section proposes an analysis of syntactic evidentials in English on the 
basis of the cartographic framework introduced in the previous section.  Recent 
work on the articulation of the CP/IP domain has argued that there is a functional 
projection dedicated to evidentiality at the top of the clausal structure (cf. Cinque 
(1999), Tenny (2006)).  Following this approach, this paper assumes that there is a 
functional projection dedicated to evidentiality in the CP domain, as illustrated 
below: 
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 (6) Force … Evid(ential) … Finite IP  
 
The Evid head is activated when there is a C-I interface requirement; namely, the 
speaker’s intention to mark the (type of) source of information.  The activated Evid 
head, then, has the uninterpretable feature [u-Evid-F] to be checked-off and deleted 
by merging a syntactic object with the interpretable feature [Evid-F] either to [Spec, 
Evid] or the Evid head (cf. Chomsky (1995)).2 
     As mentioned in section 1, English sentences are normally not sensitive to the 
source of information; they include no evidential expression.  This means that such 
sentences have CP structures with the inert Evid-head.  Evidential expressions like 
I hear are used to fulfill pragmatic purposes, such as to show the speaker’s inability 
to assert the validity of the propositional content in question (cf. Aijmer (1980), 
Okada (1985), Ifantidou (1994), and Fox (2001)).  In this case, the Evid-head is 
activated, and is checked-off and deleted by merging to [Spec, Evid] these evidential 
expressions with the interpretable feature [Evid-F].  This derivational process can 
be illustrated as follows: 
 
 (7) a.  I hear Mary won the prize. 
  b.   EvidP 
 
  External Merge → I-hear [Evid] Evid’ 
 
 Evid [u-Evid]  Fin 
 
      Mary won the prize 
 
The syntactic element, I hear, in (7a) is merged into [Spec, Evid].  The syntactic 
object with [Evid] checks-off and deletes the u-Evid in the Evid head, and the 
derivation successfully converges, or ends up with a legitimate syntactic 
representation.   
     How, then, are the discontinuous syntactic elements like I hear reanalyzed as 
constituents to fulfill [Spec, Evid]?  To answer this question, following the parallel 
                                                  
     2 The requirement stated here can be further refined.  One possibility is to unify it to 
theta-criterion:  in this analysis, some evidential meaning is assigned to a propositional content as 
an adjunct theta-role (cf. Zubizarreta (1987)).  Alternatively, the requirement for deleting [u-Evid] 
can be stated as criterion in Rizzi’s (1997, 2004) sense as stated in the previous section:  in his 
term, criterion is a requirement to be satisfied by movement of a syntactic object to a designated 
position in the CP domain.  The present proposal here assumes that [u-Evid-F] is deleted by 
external merge, and thus, is basically in accord with Zubizarreta’s (1987) idea. 
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architecture model by Ackema and Neeleman (2004), this paper proposes that 
English evidential expressions are derived independently of the structures other than 
them (e.g., Mary won the prize in I hear Mary won the prize).  Specifically, the 
evidential expressions are first derived as syntactic constituents; they are then 
assigned the interpretable feature [Evid-F], being renumerated as a kind of 
functional element.  The derivation described here is schematized below (N in (8b) 
is an abbreviation of numeration): 
 
 (8) a.  I hear Mary won the prize. 
  b.   
    Representation 1 Representation 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     The next section provides evidence for the derivational process proposed in 
this section. 
 
4.  Evidence for the Proposal 
4.1.  The Tense Form of Evidential Expressions 
     The first evidence comes from the tense form of a syntactic evidential.  Let 
us consider the following example: 
 
 (9)   [I hear] Mary won the prize. (Anderson (1986:276)) 
 
The bracketed evidential expression in (9) takes the present tense form, though it is 
clear that the speaker receives the information conveyed by the propositional content 
at some point in the past (Anderson (1986)).  This property is accounted for in the 
 
 
I hear 
 EvidP 
 
 I-hear Evid’ 
 
 Evid FinP 
 
 
 Mary won the prize
 
N = {I-hear [Evid-F], Mary, win, …} 
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following manner.  The evidential expression I hear is structured as an evidential 
expression independently of the structure Mary won the prize, as illustrated in (8b); 
it is not derived to describe the actual event the speaker experienced.  Hence, it is 
not required to reflect the actual time when the information in question was gained. 
 
4.2.  Focal Accent 
     The second evidence is relevant to the difference in focal accent between 
embedding verbs and their evidential uses.  An embedding verb with accent cannot 
function as an evidential (Anderson (1986)): 
 
 (10) a.  [I heard] (that) Mary won the PRIZE.  [Evidential] 
 b.  I HEARD that Mary won the prize.  [Embedding] 
(Anderson (1986:276)) 
 
Expressions like I heard in (10a) are derived as evidential expressions with [Evid-F], 
serving to check-off [u-Evid] in the same way as grammatical evidentials in other 
languages such as Japanese.  So, English evidential expressions can be regarded as 
a kind of functional element, rather than lexical one (e.g., semi-lexical categories 
such as light verbs (cf. Emonds (2000))).  Thus, they do not receive accent because 
functional elements, in general, does not receive focal accent. 
 
4.3.  Question Formation 
     The third evidence comes from the it is that-construction, which Ikarashi 
(2015) assumes is an inferential evidential.  Let us first consider the following 
example: 
 
 (11)  He was shot in his house.  It is that he knew too much.  
     (Declerck (1992:219)) 
 
The it is that-construction in (11) gives an explanation for the shooting of the person 
in question.  Notice that there can be several possible causes other than the one 
given in (11) (e.g., he insulted the murderer, he stole the murderer’s wallet).  So the 
proposition in the that-clause can be interpreted to be chosen from these candidates 
as the most plausible explanation.  This process is called abduction, and the it is 
that-construction encodes abductive inference (Ikarashi (2015)).  Given that the 
construction is an abductive inferential evidential, let us consider the following 
example: 
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 (12) “It’s just, don’t you think older guys expect a little more?”  Eva prodded. 
(C. Carter, 16 Isn’t Always Sweet) 
 
The structure in the that-clause is derived independently of the evidential expression, 
it is (or it’s just), which is merged with [Spec, Evid] after receiving [Evid-F].  This 
structure is, thus, not an embedded, but a matrix clause, enabling the Fin head to be 
endowed with the uninterpretable [+ V] feature in yes-no question (cf. Rizzi and 
Shlonsky (2007)).  Consequently, as shown in the following configuration, the it is 
that-construction has a structure which allows the subject-auxiliary inversion to take 
place. 
 
 (13) [Force [Evid It’s just [Fin don’t [IP you <don’t> think older guys expect a little 
  more]]]] 
 
4.4.  Slifting 
     Lastly, s(entence)lifting lends support to the present proposal.  Let us 
consider the following discourse patterns, observed by Hooper (1975:96): 
 
 (14) a.  Who said anything about hiring a woman? 
  b.  The boss says we have to hire a woman. 
  c. * We have to hire a woman, the boss says. 
 (15) a.  Did he consider my application? 
  b.  No, he says we have to hire a woman. 
  c.  No, we have to hire a woman, he says. 
 
The wh-question in (14a) is intended to require the hearer to provide the value of the 
wh-word.  In (14b), an answer to the question in (14a), the focus is put on the 
information source (i.e., the boss).  So the expression the boss says, according to 
Anderson (1986), is not an evidential.  In this case, we cannot use as an answer a 
slifting structure like (14c).  On the other hand, such a structure can be used as an 
answer to the question in (15a); in (15a), unlike in (14a), the questioner does not 
focus on who said the relevant propositional content, and thus, the expression he 
says in (15b) and (15c) is not a main point of utterance, but a specification added to 
the information we have to hire a woman; it specifies the source of information.  In 
this sense, this expression can be considered an evidential. 
     The facts observed in (14) and (15) can be accounted for on the basis of the 
proposal given above.  Since the expression the boss says in (14b) is not an 
evidential, it takes an embedding clause, as shown in (16a).  On the other hand, the 
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expression he says in (15b) is an evidential.  Based on our proposal, it does not 
take an embedded clause, but is merged with [Spec, Evid] in the main clause, as 
illustrated in (16b).  
 
(16) a.  [ForceP … [FinP [IP The boss says [ForceP [FinP [IP we have to hire a 
woman]]]]]] (= (14b)) 
 b. [ForceP … [EvidP The boss says [FinP [IP we have to hire a woman]]]] 
(= (15b)) 
 
Here, we would like to assume that slifting sentences are derived by the movement 
of the FinP into [Spec, ForceP].  As seen in the previous section, FinP determines 
the finiteness of a sentence, and therefore, serves as a syntactic object to which 
movement is applied.  This assumption provides the sentences in (14c) and (15c) 
with the structures in (17a) and (17b), respectively. 
 
(17) a.  [ForceP … [FinP The boss says [ForceP [FinP we have to hire a woman]]]] 
＊ (= (14c)) 
 
 b. [ForceP … [EvidP The boss says [FinP we have to hire a woman]]] 
(= (15c)) 
 
The derivation in (17a) involves the movement of the FinP over the FinP in the main 
clause.  This pattern can be seen as an instance of relativized minimality violation 
in the sense of Rizzi (2004), which bans a syntactic configuration in which a 
syntactic object with a feature X cannot move to [Spec, X] over another syntactic 
object with the same feature X.  Hence, the derivation in (17a) is excluded due to 
the feature-based relativized minimality violation.  (17b), on the other hand, is a 
legitimate syntactic object because it does not cause a relativized minimality 
violation.  Hence, the slifting structure in (15c) is grammatical while that in (14c) 
is not. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
     This paper first observed that English, unlike Japanese, does not obligatorily 
encode the source of information, but a syntactic evidential element like I hear is 
used to meet the pragmatic requirement that the speaker has the intention to avoid 
responsibility for or authorize the propositional content a given sentence.  We 
proposed a mechanism to derive a syntactic evidential like I hear in English on the 
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basis of the cartographic framework proposed by Rizzi (1997, 2004) and Cinque 
(1999).  This proposal was supported by the four pieces of evidence. 
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